Dedre Gentner

Alice Gabrielle Twight Professor of Psychology & Education


Curriculum vitae



(847)467-1272


Department of Psychology

Northwestern University



Deep thinking in children: The case for knowledge change in analogical development


Journal article


D. Gentner, M. J. Rattermann
1998

Semantic Scholar DOI
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Cite

APA   Click to copy
Gentner, D., & Rattermann, M. J. (1998). Deep thinking in children: The case for knowledge change in analogical development.


Chicago/Turabian   Click to copy
Gentner, D., and M. J. Rattermann. “Deep Thinking in Children: The Case for Knowledge Change in Analogical Development” (1998).


MLA   Click to copy
Gentner, D., and M. J. Rattermann. Deep Thinking in Children: The Case for Knowledge Change in Analogical Development. 1998.


BibTeX   Click to copy

@article{d1998a,
  title = {Deep thinking in children: The case for knowledge change in analogical development},
  year = {1998},
  author = {Gentner, D. and Rattermann, M. J.}
}

Abstract

two of the terms in the three-relation (see sect. 3.5). Hence, 3-year-olds default to the more familiar judgment (Frye et al. 1996) and make the realist error of concluding that everyone will see the situation as it really is. Another advantage of complexity, one that may be unique, is that it manifests what the target article labels " omni-directional access " (sect. 2.2.6). When children master a set of relations, there are a number of different, equivalent problems they will be able to solve. Consequently, it becomes possible to predict that seemingly unrelated developments will have a common source. For example , it is well established that children's understanding of false belief is connected to their ability to act deceptively (Wimmer & Perner 1983) although this link could be conceptual, given belief is involved in both. However, theory of mind has now been shown to be related to executive function (for a review, see Zelazo et al. 1997) – that is, the development of children's abilities to control their own actions. Mental state understanding and control of one's own actions do not share an obvious conceptual link, yet their similarity can be explained in a complexity account (Frye, in press; Ze-lazo et al. 1997). Despite the similarities, there are some points of disagreement between the complexity proposals of the target article and CCC theory. Both now indicate that a conditional (basically, an or that selects between perspectives – the child's and the other person's in false belief) forms the ternary relation that supports the acquisition of theory of mind. However, the relational complexity account fails to recognize the hierarchical dependency that obtains among dimensions in this instance (although it could in principle; see sect. 4.2.5). For example, one cannot tell by looking at the ternary relation, Seen-Object (ϽconditionϾ, Ͻobject-colourϾ, ϽperceptϾ), whether one argument controls the others. In contrast , on the CCC account, the task is difficult precisely because it requires a hierarchical rule structure. Moreover, the relational complexity account does not appear to consider the relation's type when predicting developmental difficulty. All that seems important is the complexity of the relation. CCC theory distinguishes among relational types in addition to structural complexity. Theory of mind involves choosing between perspectives, ignoring a familiar one to judge from the other, which will be simpler than combining perspectives, even though both require ternary relations. Being able to select flexibly between dimensions occurs …


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